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Reacting to Hate Radio

Radio Netherlands Media Network

08-01-2004

"Negative" media intervention includes jamming or switching off programmes altogether, measures which can be applied either separately or jointly, and are used to deal swiftly and effectively with the offending media, and to signal resolve. However, as they mainly rely on coercion and run contrary to many accepted norms and rules in terms of freedom of speech and national sovereignty, they also raise a number of issues. Furthermore, as they are sometimes technically difficult to implement and not always fully effective they are rarely used.

Jamming transmitters in Estonia, 1956 (Photo: Museum of Occupations, Tallinn)Jamming has been used extensively for a long time throughout the world at times of war and of peace to disrupt military communications or “propaganda” broadcasts. The latter use makes jamming highly unpalatable to many in democratic countries. A detailed and ilustrated account of jamming operations in Estonia during the Cold War will be published on this Web site in a few weeks’ time.

Technically, jamming requires the means to produce broadcast signals locally in the case of FM broadcasts, either through transmitters based in or near the target area stations, or from aircraft flying near the target zone. This method was used by the US military in the Gulf War, in operations in Grenada, Panama and Haiti operations and more recently on a wide scale in the Kosovo operation, where the US Air Force used converted C-130 transport aircraft, the EC-130 Commando Solo, to jam TV and radio broadcasts and substitute messages on any frequency. At the end of the war, Yugoslav officials reported over 400 NATO attempts to replace Yugoslav radio and TV programmes with their own broadcasts aired from Romania, Hungary, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania or from US EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft.

Ground-based jamming of FM broadcasts (figure 1) requires the local deployment of transmitters and is thus dependent on the good will of local authorities or neighbouring countries, and the availability of electric power to operate the equipment. It might also involve the deployment of troops on the ground to protect the equipment and its operators. Airborne jamming is costly and dependent on the possibility of deploying aircraft in the required zone, and may require additional aircraft or ground forces to protect the jamming aircraft from attacks. Jamming of SW and AM broadcasts (figure 2) can be achieved from further afield.

jamming1

jamming2

In Rwanda in 1994 the UN military commander in Kigali, Gen Romeo Dallaire, some international human rights organisations and even several US senators called for hate broadcasts by RTLM to be jammed.

Switching off broadcasts can be achieved by destroying or seizing broadcasting equipment. This was the method used during the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraqi transmitters were destroyed, in 1995 in Bosnia-Hercegovina, when NATO forces destroyed the Bosnian Serb radio and TV transmitters, and again later on a number of occasions in Bosnia-Hercegovina where Bosnian Serb transmitters were either occupied or switched off temporarily until they had complied with provisions of the Dayton agreement or Sfor requirements to stop inflammatory broadcasts.

The 1999 Kosovo conflict provided the first attempt to implement this approach on a massive scale. Serb radio and TV (RTS) transmitter and aerial installions were extensively attacked and even Belgrade's main RTS building was the target of a missile attack which killed several RTS employees and provoked angry international reactions on the part of other broadcasters and media bodies. At the end of the war Serb official sources claimed that NATO had carried out over 400 attacks on broadcasting facilities, firing over 1,000 missiles at them, destroying 17 out of 19 transmitters and causing damage estimated at over one billion dollars.

As both jamming and switching off transmitters call for sophisticated technical capabilities, available to a few countries only, and the use of coercion, which requires a minimum of international consensus, they are not generally easy to implement. Furthermore they are not always efficient, particularly in the case of mobile transmitters (as was the case of Rwanda, when RTLM switched to a mobile FM transmitter after the Rwandese Patriotic Front forces shelled its Kigali transmitter). They are also relatively slow to deploy.

“Positive” media intervention is achieved through support for local independent media and the production and dissemination of independent, unbiased broadcasts by “peace” radio or TV stations. These measures - particularly in the case of peace broadcasters - are also dependent on a number of factors, such as the possibility to operate locally (thus requiring the tacit agreement of local authorities, warring factions or neighbouring countries), proper financing and the possibility to start operating fairly rapidly.

These conditions are seldom met and, as a result, peace broadcasts do not usually play a significant role in conflict prevention, at best they are used in conflict resolution or peace-keeping.

Some examples of the difficulties encountered by peace broadcasters confirm the seriousness of the problem:

  • Local conditions: Radio Agatashya, broadcasting to Rwandan refugees in the wake of the 1994 conflict had to close its operations following argument with the local authorities, other stations, such as Studio Ijambo, also received threats from warring factions. The Monrovia-based US-financed Star Radio had its frequencies withdrawn for several weeks by the Liberian government in early 1998, with broadcasts resuming after pressures from foreign governments.
  • Financing: The delay in obtaining financing for peace broadcasts, or the long-term commitment to do so on the part of regional organisations or governments, is illustrated by the delay observed in the way the EU allocates funds, even when these are needed urgently (12-18 months is more a rule than an exception), or the way the US government ensures the funding of Star Radio in Liberia (no long-term plan with the station facing the constant risk of being switched off at fairly short notice). By contrast the very swift allocation of funds by the Swiss government to Fondation Hirondelle to ensure the operations of Radio Agatashya deserves a special mention.

“Preventive” media intervention

As reactive media intervention proves difficult to implement other measures of a preventive nature, or which could be implemented at very short notice - and at relatively modest cost - should also be considered, a solution which strangely enough does not seem to have been considered so far. These preventive measures could take the form of direct pressures on the interested parties: International bilateral and multilateral aid could be suspended and made conditional on the suppression of “hate” broadcasts; officials from countries tolerating or even supporting such broadcasts would be denied visas, they, or their relatives, could be prevented from settling or studying abroad, their personal assets overseas could be frozen. Warning could be issued to those engaging in hate broadcasts that they could face possible prosecution for genocide or incitement to genocide. These measures would certainly have proven effective in 1994 in the case of Rwanda where official involvement in RTLM was obvious, and where many officials had property and bank accounts or relatives living or studying in European countries.

For a fresh approach to media intervention: combining preventive and reactive measures, negative and positive actions

The current difficulties encountered by the “negative” and “positive” forms of reactive media intervention, such as the delay usually taken to deploy and implement them, and their financing, means that a fresh approach is required and that preventive measures should also be deployed if media intervention is to become a proper tool of conflict prevention and resolution.

unAn original solution, combining negative and positive measures under the aegis of the United Nations, has been put forward by Jamie F. Metzl, a former UN human rights officer, in an article published in the November-December 1997 issue of the US magazine ‘Foreign Affairs’ (Metzl also defended the legitimacy of jamming hate broadcasts in an article published in the ‘American Journal of International Law’ in October 1997).

Metzl writes that the United Nations should establish an independent information unit “monitoring, peace broadcasting and, in extreme cases, jamming [hate] radio and television broadcasts.” The unit would not act on a case-by-case basis but would have a standing authority to carry out its function with the Security Council maintaining veto power over its actions. Furthermore, argues Metzl, “it would go a long way towards securing human rights short of costly, largescale military investments.”

Metzl recalls that the UN commander in Rwanda in 1994, Gen Romeo Dallaire, said afterwards “that simply jamming Hutu broadcasts and replacing them with messages of peace and reconciliation would have had a significant impact on the course of events in Rwanda.” The approach advocated by Metzl would certainly present a number of advantages, in particular the speed of execution so important to media intervention.

Media intervention is likely to spread in years to come as it will become one of a range of tools available to help prevent, limit or resolve conflicts. It might even preclude in many instances costly military interventions. Its success will depend on the ability of the international community to react swiftly, preferably at the outset of crises, and to call on the full scope of available preventive and reactive measures, including both negative and positive actions. Proper monitoring of local media in zones of conflict will prove instrumental in achieving this aim.

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