When the West agreed to the independence of Kosovo, regardless of all Russia's protestations, it was just a question of time before a Russian response materialised. Nor was it any surprise that Georgia, where both Ossetians and Abkhazians looked to Russia for support, was the stage. But no one expected Georgia and then, willy-nilly, the West would walk into the Russian trap quite so easily.
Risks
While Russia was deliberately upping the tension in South Ossetia, providing the population with Russian passports, Europe and the United States seemed to have little idea of the impact of their double insult. Following the recognition of Kosovo, the prospect of future NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia was a further affront to Russia.
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Outcome of NATO's meeting in Brussels on 19 August 2008
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Georgia's miscalculation
However, this bad news was not communicated clearly to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. On the contrary, Washington put Georgia on a pedestal as the symbol of democracy in Russia's backyard. President Saakashvili miscalculated, ignored warnings from the United States and took on Moscow. Had Georgia actually been a member of NATO, it would have dragged the US and Europe into a military conflict with Russia.
Fraser Cameron, director of the EU-Russia Centre think tank, argues that the calls, from Poland, Lithuania and others, to hurry and make Georgia a member of NATO are a little reckless. "It's fine to make calls for this if you don't take the responsibility for the Article 5 defence. But the reality is there are very few governments in NATO willing to accelerate the process."
This kind of posturing is all fine and good, but in the end it would be the Americans not the Poles who would have to support Georgia under Article 5 of the NATO charter.
So, no rapid NATO membership for Georgia. And the same goes for Ukraine. However, there are other analysts, like Dutch Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel de Haas, who support this as the proper response to Russia's power games.
"Ukraine, of course, has a large Russian minority, in the eastern part of country and particularly in the Crimea, the home base of the Russian fleet. It's not inconceivable that the Russians will say: we have to protect the Russian minority."
Colonel De Haas says the possibility that the Russians will want to repeat their successful Georgian strategy in Ukraine cannot be ruled out. In Georgia, Moscow said it had to protect the Russian minority. In the case of mounting tension in Ukraine, the Russians could use the same argument to intervene and "come to the aid of" the Russian minority there.
Repeating the same scenario
Sowing dissent, destabilising the country and hoping the West does not have the nerve to take action; it's not an unattractive scenario for Moscow, and would enable it to take the initiative. But, according to Fraser Cameron, accelerated NATO membership is no answer.
"Essentially the bilateral relationship has to be resolved between Kiev and Moscow. There is not a great deal the EU or NATO can do in this context."
For now, Moscow has the reins firmly in its hands. It has skilfully alternated between Prime Minister Putin's unadulterated power politics and President Medvedev's more diplomatic approach. They represent the two camps in Moscow whose internal struggle has not yet been resolved.
NATO and the EU can only hope that the moderate forces in Moscow prevail in the long run. In the meantime, Europe would be well advised to make itself less dependent on Moscow and seriously explore alternative energy sources.
* RNW translation (imm)
Tags: Abkhazia, Dmitry Medvedev, Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, NATO, Russia, South Ossetia, Vladimir Putin