Right at the outset of the operation, on 1 August 2006, it was stated that the Dutch NATO force in the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan - 'Task Force Uruzgan' - would proceed with its work following an 'ink blot' strategy, beginning first with the creation of a base area in the south of the province before going on to move and expand into the north.
Now, however, the second part of this plan looks a very distant prospect. RNW Security and Defence editor Hans de Vreij says too few Dutch troops are currently deployed in the province and, moreover, their rules of engagement prohibit them from taking a sufficiently active stance in dealing with the Taliban fighters in the region.
![Dutch troops in Afghanistan [ANP]](../images/assets/12800625) |
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TARIN KOWT - Dutch military personnel loading their weapons before setting out on patrol in Uruzgan province |
This week, three members of the Dutch cabinet - the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and development cooperation - paid a lightning visit to Afghanistan. It was the first trip to the country for new Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, but his colleagues Eimert van Middelkoop (defence) and Bert Koenders (development) had already been there, albeit not in their current positions.
While in Kabul, the three cabinet members made additional financial commitments for the reconstruction of the Afghan police force and presented plans aimed at replacing the country's lucrative poppy-growing industry with the cultivation of other lucrative crops, such as saffron.
No easy task
The main objective of the Dutch 'Task Force Uruzgan' is to create the conditions for a secure and stable situation in the province - starting in the south - in order to make it possible to carry out (re)construction work. The previous Dutch government had already made it clear that this was not going to be an easy task.
Before the mission - which began on 1 August last year and is set to last two years - was launched, the cabinet of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende stated that: "The government expects there will be some visible results towards the end of the anticipated period of deployment."
Words which clearly reflect the very modest nature of the cabinet's expectations as to the outcome of the mission.
Current situation
The current situation in Uruzgan is as follows. In cooperation with the Afghan military and police, the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan now controls the three main centres of population in the area: the provincial capital, Tarin Kowt; the tiny town of Deh Rawod, located further to the west, and the small town of Chora, which is situated further north.
As for the rest of the province, this is mainly in the hands of the Taliban and other armed groups, other than those areas located immediately around the two American bases in the province: Forward Operating Base (FOB) Anaconda in the east, and FOB Cobra in the north-west.
Armed protection
However, even in Tarin Kowt the situation is not yet safe and secure enough for members of the Dutch armed forces to walk around in the town without fearing for their lives. There is still a constant need for protection. Furthermore, the main road between Tarin Kowt and Chora cannot be used because it runs through the Baluchi Valley, which is controlled by the Taliban. In the area immediately north of Tarin Kowt - known as the 'West Bank' - fighting occurs with clock-like regularity.
Given this situation, one simple conclusion that might be drawn is that the Netherlands and the Afghan government have simply sent too few troops to Uruzgan to be able to achieve the stated objectives at any speed. It's a fact of military life, however, that the Dutch armed forces simply have to make do with the means - and rules of engagement - placed at their disposal by government and parliament.
Pattern
These rules of engagement happen to be top secret, but it won't have escaped the Taliban's notice that, since 1 August 2006, a certain pattern can be discerned: as long as the Dutch troops are not attacked, or there are no clear signs of any plans in that direction, the 'opposing military forces' (OMF) are - and have been - left largely alone.
Earlier this week, the voice of an unnamed Dutch Apache helicopter pilot was heard on a local radio station in the Netherlands saying: "There has to be real enemy action targeting our ground troops - they have to be under fire - directly or indirectly - only then will we possibly deploy our weapons."Be certain
Further confirmation comes from a weblog kept by a Dutch soldier: "[We] only shoot when there's clear enemy action, or in self defence. In addition, before we fire, we have to be certain that we are shooting at opponents and not at innocent civilians. So, there needs to be positive identification." Then there is this, also taken from a public source: "You are not allowed to carry out bombardments or to shoot in all situations. Enemy forces that are planning to start beating a retreat and leave behind their weapons and equipment are no longer a threat and, therefore, may no longer be pursued with the aim of annihilating them." 'Too soft'
British and Canadian media have already voiced criticism of what they perceive as being 'too soft' an approach in Uruzgan. Another factor in this criticism is the fact that - so far - not one Dutch soldier has been killed in action in Uruzgan, whilst the British in Helmand province and the Canadians in Kandahar have already lost dozens of troops.
It is clear therefore that the Dutch troops are not pursuing an active policy aimed at eliminating the Taliban threat in 'their' province, and even the plans for an expansion of the 'ink blot' around Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora have been put on a back burner until the summer at least.
The current commander of the Task Force, Colonel Hans van Griensven, wants to wait first to see what comes of the spring offensive already announced by the Taliban, as well as further stabilising the situation within the confines of the current 'ink blot'.
While it may appear that the operation is proceeding extremely slowly, it is worth noting once again that the objective was and is simply for the Dutch mission in Uruzgan to produce some 'visible results' by the summer of 2008.
* RNW Internet translation (tpf)
Tags: British, Canada, Canadian, deaths, engagement, force, Helmand, Kandahar, Kowt, NATO, Netherlands, remit, rules, Taliban, Tarin, task, troops, Uruzgan, van Griensven, Verhagen